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Abstract. Buyers in the property market often use an agent who is employed by the seller to assist their home searches. This 
unique and widely used agency arrangement in the property market is known as “sellers’ agents”. While principal-agent 
theory advocates that buyers should directly hire their agents (i.e., buyers’ agents) to do the home-hunting, search theory 
however implies that sellers would employ their agents (i.e., sellers’ agents) to increase the probability of the sale and sell-
ing prices. Although sellers’ agents and buyers’ agents are two very distinct institutions, many previous studies assume that 
their agency characteristics are identical and provide limited insights on how such a seemingly subtle but crucial agency 
arrangement affects transaction outcomes. Using transaction data from Wuhan China, this study disentangles the effects 
of the buyers’ and sellers’ agents on properties’ selling prices and their time on the market. The findings indicate that on 
average transactions conducted by sellers’ agents will be associated with a significant selling price premium of around 3.4%. 
As a critical test, we further show that the transactions completed by sellers’ agents with selling price premiums will have 
a shorter marketing time than those completed by buyers’ agents.
Keywords: sellers’ agents, search theory, overpricing, time on the market, online listing, second-hand real estate market.
Introduction
In the property market, many agents who assist the buyer 
in searching are employed by the seller. In the strategic 
property management literature, this unique agency re-
lationship is referred to by the term “sellers’ agents”. On 
the surface, this contractual arrangement should never be 
optimal as it lacks incentives to motivate sellers’ agents to 
act in the best interest of buyers (i.e., the principal-agent 
problem). Nevertheless, such a unique agency relationship 
does exist as sellers are able to increase the probability of 
selling the house by reducing buyers’ search costs. Bagnoli 
and Khanna (1987, 1991) developed a theoretical model 
to explain that the existence of sellers’ agents is due to the 
fact that the information about the property can only be 
communicated to the buyer through the time-consuming 
home inspection, and the cost of such search activities is 
non-trivial.
Notwithstanding such a unique agency relationship, 
the existing research on property agents tends to obscure 
the difference between seller agents and buyer agents (Ya-
vas, 1994). As a result, many empirical studies of prop-
erty agents offer only limited insights on how this unique 
agency characteristic affects sales outcomes. This study 
aims to fill this research gap by disentangling the role of 
buyers’ agents and sellers’ agents in residential property 
transactions: in particular, their impact on sale prices 
and time on the market. We first apply the sellers’ agent 
model (Bagnoli & Khanna, 1989) to develop our testable 
hypotheses, and we argue that those transactions that use 
sellers’ agents will be associated with a price premium. 
Also, the resultant time on the market will depend on the 
price premium/discount entailed. Given that the selling 
price carries a premium, agents should have the incentive 
to shorten the price negotiating process, and hence the 
property will have a shorter the time on market. While the 
selling price is lower (or at a discount), agents should have 
the incentive to lengthen the negotiation process.
This study utilises the novel transaction data sourced 
from one of the largest real estate brokerages in China, the 
“Lianjia”1 Real Estate Agency Co., Ltd. (formerly called 
1 Lianjia, formerly called Homelink, is a Chinese real-estate brokerage 
company founded in 2001. As of 2019, it has approximately 6,000 bro-
kerage offices and more than 120,000 brokers. As of 2019, Lianjia has 
51 subsidiaries, all related to the real-estate services, such as long-term 
rental apartment development, real-estate financing or decoration. By 
2018, Lianjia’ s market value reached US$6 billion.
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Homelink), between years 2016 and 2019, in the inland 
metropolis of Wuhan, to empirically test the use of sell-
ers’ versus buyers’ agents on property market outcomes. 
The city of Wuhan is used as our case for the following 
reasons. First, unlike many mature property markets in 
which a central information gathering system is available 
(e.g. the Multiple listing service, MLS in the United States; 
see Allen et al., 2018), homebuyers in China rely substan-
tially on the use of property agents. The reliance on agents 
(regardless of whether they are buyers’ or sellers’ agents) 
in a leading Chinese city offers an intriguing case study to 
examine the principal-agent relationship thoroughly. Sec-
ond, most of Wuhan’s urban residents live in seven densely 
populated core districts, while the surrounding suburban 
districts are mostly rural. This concentrated urban land-
scape of Wuhan provides us with relatively good control 
of spatial variability in housing prices. Third, Wuhan is 
a top-tier city in China, with the residential transaction 
turnover ranking third among all cities. This indicates that 
Wuhan has an active housing market that offers us a capti-
vating case to study. More importantly, the Wuhan’s Hous-
ing Security and Management Bureau is keen to regulate 
online information dissemination regarding second-hand 
property transactions. This policy helps ensure high-qual-
ity and trustworthy data online (Wuhan Housing Security 
and Management Bureau, 2018).
Our study is novel for several reasons. First, there is a 
paucity of literature providing direct evidence to dissect 
the influence of sellers’ agents (versus buyers’ agents) on 
transacted prices and time on the market. To the best of 
our knowledge, little research has been done to under-
stand the different effects of buyers’ and sellers’ agents on 
transaction outcomes. Many previous studies have consid-
ered these two institutions of agency as having the same 
behavioural impacts on housing transactions, while other 
research mainly focuses on the dual agency problem and 
ignores such unique agency relationships. The only excep-
tions are perhaps Bagnoli and Khanna (1987, 1991), but 
these two papers offer only a mathematical explanation 
of why, and under what conditions, buyers use agents 
employed by sellers. Even though Elder et al. (2000) did 
attempt to empirically unveil the effect of buyers’ brokers 
on market outcomes, their study did not compare buyers’ 
brokers with sellers’ brokers. Second, this study discusses 
the effects of agents only in the second-hand property 
market by using online listing information. Many previ-
ous studies related to the agent’s effect on home sales in 
the United States use the data from the Multiple Listing 
Service (MLS). These studies combine the first-hand and 
second-hand real estate market (Levitt & Syverson, 2008; 
Yavas & Yang, 1995). Our study discusses only the second-
hand market, and therefore minimises the heterogeneity 
of two markets and avoids the impact resulting from dif-
ferent policies targeting the first-hand market in China. In 
addition, the transactions in the second-hand real estate 
market account for about 34%2 of total housing transac-
tions. The online listing information has remarkable ad-
vantages in providing accurate, timely and easy-to-search 
housing-related information for agents, buyers, and sell-
ers to access. Besides the problem of data manipulation 
can also be mitigated (Wang et  al., 2020). Furthermore, 
relatively few previous studies explore the influence of 
agents in the China real estate market, mainly because of 
the lack of regulations for real estate agents in the country 
(Li & Wang, 2006; Zhou et al., 1999). With the property 
market being more formalised and regulated in China, the 
availability of public property data and the importance of 
agents’ role on the property market begin to gather trac-
tion in revisiting the property agents’ influence in this 
fast-changing residential property market. That is also one 
of the main objectives of this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
1 will provide a brief literature review on the market for 
brokerage. Section 2 will develop our testable hypotheses 
based on the agent model by Bangnoli and Khanna (1987, 
1991). Section 3 will describe the data used for the design 
and the empirical setup for the hypotheses testing. The 
empirical results will be presented in section 4. Last sec-
tion will conclude the paper.
1. Literature review
Many studies have discussed the impacts of real estate 
agents on property transactions, using two main market 
outcomes, namely the selling prices and the time on the 
market (Owen, 1977; Yinger, 1981; Anglin & Arnott, 1991; 
Benjamin et al., 2000; Jud & Winkler, 1994; Wiley et al., 
2013; Curto et al., 2015; Ferreira & Jalali, 2015; Yechiam 
et al., 2017). On the selling price dimension, Jud and Frew 
(1986) found that in Charlotte, North Carolina, housing 
prices in the agent-assisted market were higher than in the 
“by-owner” market. Salant (1991) further suggested that 
the agents’ commission may influence the asking price 
of the houses. Hughes (1995) and Zumpano et al. (1996) 
both showed that real estate agents had a positive effect 
on the selling price, and the former further suggested that 
houses sold by larger brokerage firms tend to have higher 
selling prices.
Regarding the time-on-market, much previous litera-
ture has focused on the effect of using real estate agents 
(Yang & Yavas, 1995; Allen et  al., 2015; Yang & Smeal, 
1995; Sirmans et al., 1991). Also, Haurin (1988) indicated 
that larger brokerage firms had a relatively shorter market-
ing time than did smaller brokerage firms. The effects of 
brokerage firm size on time on the market were confirmed 
by Jud et al. (1996) and Larsen and Park (1989). Goodwin 
et al. (2014) explored the words used by different brokers 
to market the property and found that brokers’ descrip-
tion of the property could affect the listing’s performance 
characteristics, such as the number of days on the market. 
2 Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China 
(MOHURD).
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Benefield et al. (2011) and Wiley et al. (2011) found that 
the limited services brokerages provided sped up the sale 
and increased the selling price. Fereidouni (2012) indicat-
ed that the increased number of total real estate agents in 
Iran and their marketing activities positively significantly 
stimulated housing prices and rents.
Moreover, some literature has focused on the impact of 
agents on property transactions, mainly from the perspec-
tive of buyer agents (Colwell et al., 1993; Yavas & Colwell, 
1999). Benjamin and Chinloy (2000) analysed the de-
tached dwelling transaction data in the Washington D.C. 
area and found that buyers’ agents tended to increase the 
listing price to capture extra return. Baryla and Ztanpano 
(1995) indicated that buyers’ agents affected homebuyers 
in three ways: improving the marginal search efficiency, 
reducing search costs, and providing more accurate in-
formation that assisted buyers to interpret the distribution 
of house prices better. Other real estate agent literature 
includes discussions of factors influencing property trans-
actions, such as imperfect information and multiple listing 
services by brokers (Wu & Colwell, 1986), and the struc-
tural characteristics and pricing strategies of the brokerage 
(Crockett, 1982; Geltner et al., 1991; Han & Strange, 2015; 
Zumpano et al., 1993; Teixeira, 1995).
A substantial body of literature has focused on the de-
terminants of individual agents’ capability on real estate 
selling (Anglin & Arnott, 1991; Baryla & Ztanpano, 1995; 
Haag et al., 2000; Gay & Zhang, 2014). Glower and Hen-
dershott (1988) found that the educational background 
of individual agents influenced their sales performance: 
agents with degree sold houses faster and sold at high-
er prices. Crellin et  al. (1988) and Abelson et  al. (1990) 
provided evidence to support the positive relationship 
between agents’ educational backgrounds and their real 
estate transactions. Moreover, Abelson et al. (1990) found 
that married and female agents sold property faster, and 
were usually higher performers than male agents. Also, 
many previous studies have discussed the effects of char-
acteristics of individual agents, including race, previous 
working experiences, the license owned, perceptions of 
the real estate industry, and hours worked, on prices and 
time on the market (Follain et al., 1987; Sirmans & Swice-
good, 1997; Jud & Winkler, 1998).
Turnbull and Dombrow (2007) suggested that agents 
who specialised in listing properties obtained higher prices 
for their sellers while those who specialised in selling ob-
tained lower prices for their buyers. The greater scale of list-
ing and selling activity by an agent tends to lower the selling 
price and to lengthen the time on the market. By comparing 
the selling of houses owned by agents with those owned 
by clients, Levitt and Syverson (2008) concluded that if the 
agents had more information, the homes might sell for a 
relatively higher price and be longer on the market. Johnson 
et al. (2004) investigated the relationship between bonuses 
for agents and their performance in the house selling and 
found that real estate offering a bonus experienced longer 
marketing time and lower property prices. More recently, 
Arndt et al. (2013, 2017) found that segments of custom-
ers were not necessarily drawn to similar agents or more 
attractive ones. Wong and Cheung (2017) argue that land-
lord may exploit tenants who have made non-redeployable 
investments and charge them an occupancy premium. Ver-
straete and Verhaeghe (2020) suggested that the real estate 
agent would ethnically discriminate the rental candidates 
based on the owners’ ethical preference.
However, little research has been done on the differ-
ences between buyer agents and seller agents on transac-
tion outcomes. As advocated by Findlay and Gibb (1998) 
in their study of estate agency pricing in Scotland, more 
research is needed within the broader analysis of local 
housing markets on estate agency and conveyancing mar-
kets. While Bagnoli and Khanna (1987, 1991) developed 
a theoretical model to explain that the exorbitant cost of 
personal investigation of houses is the main reason that 
buyers use agents employed by sellers, they did not put 
forward their theories to test. In the ensuing section, we 
will use Bagnoli and Khanna (1987)’s model as a basis for 
developing our hypotheses concerning both sale price and 
time on the market and will use the transaction data in a 
Chinese city to test these hypotheses.
2. A simple model of buyers’ and sellers’ agents
In this section, we present a simple model based on Bag-
noli and Khanna (1987, 1991) and Johnson et al. (2007) 
to derive hypotheses which can be tested empirically3. 
Consider houses as a vector of characteristics  ω and the 
buyers’ reservation price for a home as (r ω). Assume 
that each seller has a reservation price  (c ω). Each seller 
chooses a listing price,  (p ω), at which he plans to sell his 
house. The buyers know only the distribution of vectors 
( ),p w  available but must personally search to inspect the 
characteristics of a particular home. The seller is assumed 
to choose a listing price to maximise his expected profits 
(i.e., capital gains from the sales in this case), which are:
( ) ( ) ( )  ,
0 otherwise, no sales
p c if r p
p
 − ω ω ≥π ω = 

. (1)
If the buyers have different reservation prices that are 
unknown to sellers, Bagnoli and Khanna (1987) suggest 
that we can let the probability that no buyer’s reservation 
price is larger than some number x be ( ) ;G x ω , and the 
seller’s expected profit will be ( )( ) ( )( ) 1 ;p c G p− ω − ω . The 
seller chooses the price *p  that satisfies:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
*
* *
* *
1 ; 1,
;
G p
p p c
g p p
− ω
π ω = − ω = ≡
ω λ
, (2)
where: ( )*pλ  is the hazard rate of the distribution G. It 
is intuitive that if sellers increase the price by a dollar, the 
capital gains (profit) ( ), pπ ω  will increase by that dol-
lar with probability ( )*1 ;G p− ω , while the denominator 
measures the likelihood sellers lose the deal.
3 While the hypotheses can be derived by many simple models, we 
would like to follow the intuition of Bagnoli and Khanna (1987, 1991) 
to save the effort to mathematically prove the existence of equilibrium.
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To understand the behaviour of sellers’ agents, we can 
examine the probability of selling a house in this theo-
retical setting (Johnson et al., 2007; Brastow et al., 2012; 
Waller & Marks, 2010). The introduction of a seller’s agent 
reduces the buyer’s search costs and hence increases the 
probability of buyers investigating houses. To make this 
maximisation problem tractable, we can further assume 
an extreme that every buyer search using the seller’s 
agents. Since every buyer search, the seller can now set 
his price equal to the maximum reservation price. If 
this value is ( ) r ω , the seller’s expected profit becomes 
( ) ( ) ar c w sω − −  where  as is the fee is for using the sell-
ers’ agents.
Without the use of the sellers’ agents, the probability 
that a house being sold is ( )*1 ;G p− ω , but with sellers’ 
agents, the house is sold whenever the maximum reser-
vation price, ( ) ( )   ar c w sω > + is reached. That means the 
use of the seller’s agent increases the probability of sell-
ing the house and enables it to be sold at a higher price
( ) ( )* (  )r pω > ω . When sellers do not have agents, the 
( )*p ω  is strictly less than the largest reservation price 
( )  r ω of any buyer who is searching, because the seller 
faces a trade-off when choosing the price.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Ceteris paribus, the use of sellers’ 
agents (AGTS) will entail higher selling prices.
With the reduction in search costs, sellers can induce 
more buyers to search. As one increases the selling price 
*p , the profit ( )*,  pπ ω rises if the seller still sells the 
house, but that lowers the probability of sale ( )*1 ;G p− ω .
( ) ( ) ( )( )
*
*
1 ;
,
;
G p
p p c
g p
− ω
π ω = − ω =
ω
. (3)
In this simple model, buyers have no incentive to with-
hold their reservation prices from the seller’s agent, and 
the agent has a motivation to confine the search intensity. 
But, in reality, if we allow the buyer and seller to bargain 
over the selling price ( )* p ω . Certainly, we can introduce 
the mixed-strategy equilibrium (i.e., the Nash equilibri-
um) analysis for tracing the equilibrium prices, but for 
the empirical test, we would intuitively argue that the sell-
ing price would be subject to the price premium/discount 
implied from H1. Given that the selling price is higher 
(or a premium), the agents (either representing sellers or 
buyers) will have an incentive to shorten the price ne-
gotiations process. When the selling price is lower (or a 
discount), agents will have the incentive to lengthen the 
negotiation process to secure a favourable price outcome. 
The resultant time on the market will depend on the price 
premium/discount entailed.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Ceteris paribus, transactions con-
ducted by agents with a higher (lower) selling price will 
attribute a shorter (longer) time-on-the market (TOM).
3. Research design
In China’s second-hand real estate market, a seller could 
either post the property information online by themselves 
or contact one agent to list his/her property for sale, and 
if the property information posted by the seller, an agent 
will be assigned to inspect relevant information and to 
list the house4. Both online designated agents and agents 
contacted by the seller are regarded as sellers’ agents. A 
potential buyer could contact the agent for details and re-
quest to have the house inspection. Meanwhile, delegate 
potential buyers can walk in any chain stores of the bro-
kerage and agents will serve these potential buyers. The 
agents serving potential buyers, either online or offline, 
are regarded as buyers’ agent5. In the meantime, sellers 
would delegate a listing agent to market their properties. 
The brokerage’s website contains a section entitled “List-
ing Property” with the listing agent’s contact information. 
Agents usually need to compete with their rivals to be the 
listing agent of a property based on their performance. 
Therefore, the listing agent who is usually the seller’s agent 
(or could possibly be buyers’ agent in some cases)6. Once 
the property was successfully sold, the website will mark 
the deal as “sold”, and the corresponding agent7 who con-
tributed the most in the entire transaction process will be 
indicated. That corresponding agent will receive the major 
part of the commission from the transaction. The infor-
mation also reveals whether the agent is a buyers’ agent or 
sellers’ agent. We make use of this information to identify 
whether this is the seller’s agent or buyer’s agent in this 
study.
3.1. Empirical model
The main objective of this study was to test how sellers’ 
versus buyers’ agents affect: (1) the transacted prices; and 
(2) the time-on-market (TOM) of the property.
To test the H1, whether the housing transaction with 
seller agents gives a price premium, we specify the follow-
ing Equation:
0   n n n i j j m mlnP ln AGTEXP D= α + α +β +ρ + γ + εiX AGT ,
(4)
where: lnP is the natural logarithm of property prices. Xn 
is a vector of hedonic variables including, size, age, lease 
4 If the seller posted the information online by themselves, it will be 
shown on the brokerage’s internal system, the brokerage will assign 
an agent from the nearest chain store to contact the seller, and the 
property will be listed after the agent’s inspection.
5 Potential buyers may be interested in diverse properties in different 
communities and districts. Thus, they can contact any agents to be 
their corresponding agents. All agents ever served potential buyers are 
regarded as buyers’ agents.
6 The listing agent is the seller’s agent and is appointed by the seller to 
help them search buyers and facilitate the price negotiation process.
7 The agent who brings about the sale is the one who receives the com-
mission.
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term, lift ratio and the overall second-hand housing price 
indices of Wuhan, China. A set of dummy variables, Dm 
including the bedroom (BEDR), bathroom (BATHR), the 
direction of the flats (DIR), and the extent of property 
decoration (DEC) are entered into the equation as the 
control. Agents’ length of work experience (AGTEXP, in 
categorical years) is also included. ε is the error term.
Equation (4) was estimated with different types of 
agents AGTi used in the transaction. When the subscript 
i  = S, it represents the use of seller agents in the trans-
action, while i = B means the buyer agent is used. That 
means AGTS is the indicator variables where = 1 if it is a 
deal done by a seller’s agent, 0 = otherwise; and AGTB = 1 
represents the buyers’ agent, 0 = otherwise. Given that H1 
is confirmed, the coefficient βS is expected to be positive 
(βS > 0) with AGTS, while the coefficient βB is expected to 
be less positive (or even negative) when the buyer agents 
AGTB are used.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) suggests that for the property with 
a higher selling price (i.e., sellers’ agents in this case), a 
shorter time-on-market will be exhibited (as compared to 
buyers’ agents). The proposed regression model to test the 
H2 is as follows:
0 i µ
,
k n s s
j j m m
lnTOM ln lnADJP
AGTEXP M
= ω +ω +ϕ + +
ρ + δ + θ
n iV AGT
 
(5)
where:  klnTOM  is the natural logarithm of the property’s 
time on the market. Similarly, to Equation (2), Vi is a vec-
tor of hedonic variables including, size, age, lease term, lift 
ratio and the overall second-hand housing price indices 
of Wuhan, China.  slnADJP  indicates the natural loga-
rithm of the property overpricing. AGTEXP represents 
the length of work experience for agents (in categorical 
years). Compared to Equation (4), the main difference of 
Equation (5) is that it includes the overpricing8 measures 
(i.e., ln(ADJP)). Yavas and Yang (1995) suggest that the 
listing price, rather than sales prices, would affect how 
long the transaction takes and thus the time-on-the-
market (TOM) should be the results from the bargain-
ing between the seller and the buyers. Besides, McGreal 
et  al. (2010) suggested that the departure between list 
price and sale price are varied across the market cycle 
and related to the time on the market. Therefore, em-
pirically speaking, instead of using sales price (Ps) as the 
explanatory variables for Equation (5), we incorporate 
the overprice measure. Given PL be the listing price for 
each transaction and Ps be the selling price; we derive the 
overpricing measure as ( ) /over L s sP P P P= − . As we need 
to have a logarithmic transformation for Pover, we further 
rescale the variable as non-negative, i.e., ln(ADJP) where 
( ) 1over overADJP P Min P= + − . AGTS is an indicator vari-
able where = 1, if it is a deal done by sellers’ agent, 0 = 
otherwise. AGTB  = 1 represents the buyers’ agent, 0  = 
otherwise. A set dummy variable Mm, including the bed-
8 The overpricing measure is the ratio of listing price to selling price, 
which denotes the magnitude by which the listing price exceeds the 
selling price.
room (BEDR), bathroom (BATHR), the direction of the 
flats (DIR), and the degree of property decoration (DEC) 
are covered as controls. θ is the error term.
0 i µ
.
s n j j
m m
lnADJP ln AGTEXP
M
= ω +ω + +ρ +
δ + θ
n iV AGT
 (6)
To test the H2 further, controlling for endogeneity, we 
utilise the two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) model. 
In the 2SPS model for time on the market (TOM), we 
assume that the overpricing measure (ADJP) is endog-
enous. Therefore, in the first stage, we regress the natural 
logarithm of the overpricing measure ( slnADJP ) on all 
independent variables by using the least-squares model 
presented in Equation (6). In the second stage, we use the 
predicted fitted values from the regression in the first stage 
as a substitution of the endogenous variable, and apply it 
in Equation (5). This method is based on the two-stage 
least square (2SLS) approach applied in the similar study 
(Norton & Van Houtven, 2006; Shin & Moon, 2007; Cain 
et al., 2019).
As H2 suggested, given that AGTS in Equation (4) 
shows a price premium (i.e., 0)sβ > , the sign of µs is ex-
pected to be less than that of  BAGT  (i.e., )B sµ > µ . Intui-
tively, agents opt to higher (lower) their expected profits 
with the trade-off of shortening (lengthening) the time 
that the property is on the market. The difference in mar-
keting time between sellers’ agent and buyers’ agents tells 
us such trade-off.
3.2. Data
The data used in this study are sourced from “Lianjia” 
(Homelink Real Estate Agency Co., Ltd) in Wuhan, Chi-
na. Lianjia is one of the largest real estate brokerages in 
China, and its core business targets the second-hand real 
estate market. The sample period of the data was from 
January 20169 to March 2019 (2016M1 to 2019M3). The 
data recorded residential property sales from 14 districts 
in Wuhan, covers 2,322 communities and involving 2,173 
individual real estate agents. The transaction data con-
tained the characteristics of each property, including their 
listing prices, selling price, and more importantly, whether 
a transaction was typically completed by sellers’ agent or 
buyers’ agent. A unique identifier was used to match the 
transaction data and agent information. Excluding du-
plicated listings and those with missing data, more than 
19,000 housing transactions and more than 2,000 real es-
tate agent’s information could be used.
Because the presales markets might behave very dif-
ferently from the spot sales market (Wong et  al., 2007), 
we exclude presales transactions (with building age less 
than zero; AGE < 0) from our analysis. (NB Buildings 
aged less than zero have been pre-sold, having not yet 
been completed). Some outliners such as the transaction 
with a very long time-on-the-market are removed from 
9 Lianjia published historical transaction data pertaining to Wuhan, 
starting from January 2016.
184 C. Xiong, K. S. Cheung. Understanding sellers’ agents in the residential property market
the estimation. All in all, the resultant dataset consists of 
15,922 sales. Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics 
of the variable used in the empirical model.
From the descriptive statistics, we know that the sell-
ing prices were 1.729 million on average, and that the 
transactions were in general overpriced by 2.7%. (i.e., Pov-
er = 0.027 listing price exceed the selling price by around 
2.7%). The average time on the market (TOM) was ap-
proximately two months (or 61 days), but in some cases, 
the transaction time was up to 24 months (i.e., 739 days). 
The building age (AGE) is one of the primary considera-
tions of property transactions. The mean of 8.551 suggests 
that the average building age of the second-hand property 
market in Wuhan is around eight and a half years. The 
mean of the lease term10 of the house is nearly 70 denotes 
that most of the properties are 70 years lease term. The 
households-to-lift ratio (LIFTR), is an important qual-
ity indicator that households might consider when they 
make purchase decisions concerning high-rise residen-
tial apartments in China. LIFTR describes the lift ratio, 
and the mean of 2.878 indicates that one lift services ap-
proximately three households per floor. The sellers’ agents 
(AGTS ) equals 1 when the agent represented the seller for 
more than 90% of properties the agent handled. On the 
other hand, the buyers’ agents (AGTB) equals 1 when less 
than 10% of transactions handled by the agent are a sell-
side deal. The variable AGTEXP denotes the experience of 
agents, which is measured by the number of working years 
of agents accumulated in the property industry. The mean 
of agents’ work experience (AGTEXP) is 3.362. This sug-
10 The lease term refers to the terms of land use rights, usually there are 
three types of terms for residential properties in China: 40 years, 50 
years, and 70 years.
gests the average working years of agents are between two 
to three years in the Wuhan property market. The mean 
bedrooms (BEDR) of 2.349 indicates that the homes had 
about two bedrooms on average. The indicator variable 
(BATHR) suggests that homes in many cases had more 
than one bathroom. The mean of the dummy variable, 
facing the South direction, is 0.804, while the mean value 
for facing other directions is less than 0.1 indicating that 
most homes faced South, validating the norm that Chi-
nese people prefer their homes to face South (Wang et al., 
2020; Sun 2005). The mean dummy, other decoration, is 
0.739, suggesting that most of the second-hand houses are 
decorated.
4. Empirical results and discussion
Results are presented in Table 2. Column (2) and (3) show 
the results for Equation (4) with AGTS and AGTB being 
estimated, respectively. The results of the coefficient for 
sellers’ agents (βS) is significantly positive, whereas the es-
timated coefficient for buyers’ agents (βB) is significantly 
negative. The results imply that the use of sellers’ agents 
will be associated with a higher property price. The co-
efficient indicates when sellers’ agents are employed, the 
price of the property is expected to sell 3.4% higher than 
would be the case without a specific agency arrangement 
(or even with no agents involved). In dollar terms, when 
sellers’ agents exist this price premium averages about 
RMB 59,000. Meanwhile, the use of buyers’ agents causes 
a discount on selling prices, as evidenced by the negative 
coefficient of AGTB. The coefficient of AGTB suggests a 
10.9% discount for the selling price when buyers’ agents 
are employed. In dollar terms, such a price discount aver-
ages about RMB 188,000. These results confirm our H1. 
Table 1. Description of variables and summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min Max
TOM Time on the market 61.295 70.192 1 739
PL Listing price (in million RMB) 1.775 1.063 5 19
PS Selling price (in million RMB) 1.729 1.027 4 19
Pover Overpricing measure 0.027 0.041 −0.314 1.85
HPI Second-hand housing price index (monthly) 132.221 11.802 103.1 147.8
AGE Building age 8.551 5.605 1 38
SIZE Size of the house 93.479 36.002 12.25 395
LEASETERM Lease term of the house 69.848 1.852 40 70
LIFTR Household and lift ratio 2.878 2.195 0.364 34
AGTEXP Agents’ year of work experience 3.362 1.151 1 6
BEDR Numbers of bedrooms 2.354 0.859 0 9
BATHR Numbers of bathrooms 1.281 0.507 0 6
FLR The floor level of the house 2.032 0.864 0 1
DEC Decoration of property 2.019 0.68 0 1
Notes: BEDR represents (1 = property with i bedroom, 0 = otherwise; i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9); BATHR represents (1 = property with i bedroom, 
0 = otherwise; i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6); DIRi = Direction of the property (1 = the direction i, 0 = otherwise; i = N (North), NE (Northeast), E (East), SE 
(Southeast), S (South), SW (Southwest), W (West), NW (Northwest)); FLRi = the floor of the property (1 = the floor is categorized i, 0 = otherwise; 
i = HIGH (High floor), MID (Middle floor), LOW (Low floor)); DECi = the degree of property decoration (1 = the degree of property decoration is i, 
0 = others; i = ROUGHCAST (no decoration), SIMPLE (the basic decoration), OTHERS (the general decoration), LUXURY (the luxury decoration); 
AGTEXPi = the working years of agent (1 = the working years is (i – 1) to i year, 0 = others; i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)).
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Table 2. The agents’ effect on property prices – buyers’ versus sellers’ agents
Variables
Baseline Sellers’ agents Buyers’ agents
(1) (2) (3)
AGTS 0.0340**
(0.0162)
AGTB −0.109***
(0.0203)
ln(SIZE) 0.966*** 0.965*** 0.965***
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126)
ln(AGE) −0.0610*** −0.0611*** −0.0609***
(0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00287)
ln(LEASETERM) 0.0799 0.0789 0.0815
(0.0671) (0.0670) (0.0670)
ln(LIFTR) −0.102*** −0.102*** −0.103***
(0.00574) (0.00574) (0.00574)
ln(HPI) 1.705*** 1.704*** 1.710***
(0.0265) (0.0255) (0.0264)
AGTEXP(1–6) – 1 as the base
2 (1–2 years) 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.167***
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0113)
3 (2–3 years) 0.252*** 0.256*** 0.234***
(0.0108)(0.0102) (0.0103)
4 (3–4 years) 0.263*** 0.267*** 0.245***
(0.0113)(0.0108) (0.0109)
5 (4–5 years) 0.246*** 0.250*** 0.227***
(0.0128)(0.0123) (0.0124)
6 (more than 5 years) 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.234***
(0.0143)(0.0139) (0.0140)
Constant −7.351*** −7.345*** −7.360***
(0.421)(0.421) (0.421)
Bedroom (0–9) – 0 as the base Yes Yes Yes
Bathroom (0–6) – 0 as the base Yes Yes Yes
Directions (E, N, S, W, NE, NW, SE, SW) 
– S as the base case
Yes Yes Yes
Floor level (High, Mid, Low) – Mid as the base case Yes Yes Yes
Quality (i.e., roughcast, simple, others, and luxury 
decoration as the base)
Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test Chi-sq stats:
H0: βS = βB = 0 16.68***
(0.0000)
Observations 15,922 15,922 15,922
R-squared 0.696 0.696 0.696
Notes: The dependent variable is the ln(SALEP), the natural logarithm of selling prices of property. *, **, and *** are at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The Wald test (with Chi-square statistics = 16.68) suggests 
that the coefficients of sellers’ agents AGTs (βS) and buy-
ers’ agents AGTB (βB) are statistically significantly different 
from each other.
The results for other property characteristics variables 
are consistent with our expectations. The estimated coef-
ficients for SIZE, AGE, LIFTR and HPI are significantly 
positive at the 95% level of confidence. These results im-
ply that the larger the size, the younger the building, the 
fewer households per lift and the better the market condi-
tion would lead to increases in the magnitude of property 
price, irrespective of whether the agent is a seller’s agent or 
buyer’s agent. Notably, the work experience accumulated 
by agents in the first three to four years within the prop-
erty industry can help the agent achieve a higher selling 
price, while such positive impact reaches a plateau after 
five years. This can be indicated by the significant posi-
tive coefficients of the variable AGTEXP. In addition, to 
further control for differences in the property’s character-
istics, the dummy variables of the bedroom, bathroom, 
floor level, as well as the direction and decoration of prop-
erties were included in the model.
186 C. Xiong, K. S. Cheung. Understanding sellers’ agents in the residential property market
Table 3. Time on the market (TOM) of properties – buyers’ versus sellers’ agents
Variables
OLS 2SPS
Baseline Sellers’ agents Buyers’ agents Sellers’ agents Buyers’ agents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AGTS 0.152* 0.136**
(0.0637) (0.0632)
AGTB 0.263*** 0.255***
(0.0985) (0.0978)
ln(ADJP) 2.617*** 2.596*** 2.611*** −0.0019 −0.0042
(0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.0382) (0.0382)
ln(SIZE) 0.660*** 0.658*** 0.661*** 8.165*** 8.181***
(0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.438) (0.438)
ln(AGE) 0.0241* 0.0235* 0.0240* −0.444* −0.445*
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0307) (0.0307)
ln(LEASETERM) −0.290 −0.295** −0.294 0.319 0.321
(0.324) (0.324) (0.324) (0.324) (0.324)
ln(LIFTR) 0.0480* 0.0488* 0.0493* −0.747*** −0.748***
(0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0536) (0.0536)
ln(HPI) 2.648*** 2.645*** 2.637*** 15.95*** 15.96***
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.777) (0.776)
AGTEXP(1–6) – 1 as the base
2 (1–2 years) −0.0823 −0.0725 −0.0408 1.347*** 1.381***
(0.0527) (0.0528) (0.0549) (0.0980) (0.0991)
3 (2–3 years) −0.119** −0.103** −0.0740 1.839*** 1.872***
(0.0494) (0.0498) (0.0521) (0.123) (0.124)
4 (3–4 years) −0.0994* −0.0817 −0.0552 1.950*** 1.981***
(0.0524) (0.0529) (0.0549) (0.129) (0.130)
5 (4–5 years) −0.0280 −0.0101 0.0162 1.885*** 1.915***
(0.0595) (0.0600) (0.0617) (0.125) (0.126)
6 (more than 5 years) −0.0366 −0.0173 0.00605 1.929*** 1.957***
(0.0672) (0.0676) (0.0690) (0.131) (0.132)
Constant −11.09*** −11.06*** −11.07*** −67.59*** −67.70***
(2.038) (2.038) (2.038) (3.872) (3.871)
Bedroom (0–9) – 0 as the base Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bathroom (0–6) – 0 as the base Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Directions (E, N, S, W, NE, NW, SE, 
SW) – S as the base case
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Floor level (High, Mid, Low) – Mid as 
the base case
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality (i.e., roughcast, simple, others, 
and luxury decoration as the base)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,922 15,922 15,922 15,922 15,922
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.087 0.087
Notes: The dependent variable is the ln(TOM), the natural logarithm of marketing time. *, **, and *** are at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.
Table  3 presents the test results for H2. Column (2) 
and (3) demonstrate the ordinary least regression results 
for Equation (5) with AGTS and AGTB being estimated. 
The magnitude of property overpricing has a significantly 
positive effect on the time on the market (TOM). The in-
cremental impact of the adjusted overpricing on the TOM 
is 2.617. It means that if the seller “overprices” the listing 
(or asking) prices of the property relative to the transacted 
price by one per cent, such overpricing would lead to a 
2.617% longer marketing time for the property. Besides, 
the coefficient for sellers’ agents (µS) is 0.152, which is 
significantly different from zero at the 95% level of con-
fidence. This implies that the marketing time of proper-
ties sold by sellers’ agents is on average nine days longer 
than the properties without specific agency arrangement 
(or without agents involved). Meanwhile, the coefficient 
for the buyers’ agent (µB) is significantly positive at 0.263. 
This indicates that when buyers’ agents are employed, it 
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will lengthen the time on the market of properties for six-
teen days. Column (4) and (5) shows the 2SPS results for 
marketing time. The coefficients for both sellers’ agents 
(µS)  and buyers’ agents (µB)  are consistent with the OLS 
results. The coefficient is 0.136 for sellers’ agents suggests 
that the marketing time of properties is eight days longer 
than the properties without specific agency while the 0.255 
for the sellers’ agents suggests the fifteen days longer of 
marketing time if the buyers’ agents are employed. As our 
H2 suggests, sellers’ agents (who exhibit a higher price) 
will have a shorter TOM as compared to buyers’ agents 
(who exhibit a lower price; or even a discount in our case). 
The results confirm our H2. Both coefficients from 2SPS 
results are slightly smaller than the OLS results indicates 
that the endogeneity of having a longer time on the mar-
ket with an overpriced of property is mitigated by the 
2SPS method. Interestingly, most of the results for agents’ 
work experience turn to be significantly positive in 2SPS 
estimation. This means that agents’ experience could not 
help shorten the marketing time and even lengthen the 
time on the market. This is reasonable as we hypothesised 
that the TOM is driven mostly by the price premium/dis-
count. Some control variables for properties’ characteris-
tics are consistent with our expectation. (SIZE, HPI). It 
denotes that the larger size and better market condition 
could result in a longer time on the market.
Conclusions
Sellers’ agents and buyers’ agents represent two distinct 
contractual arrangements, but previous property research 
on agency has tended to obscure such unique agency fea-
tures. This study disentangles the effects of buyers’ agents 
and sellers’ agents on properties’ selling prices and their 
time on the market. As is evident in our study, those 
transactions using sellers’ agents are associated with a sig-
nificant price premium, while such effects do not prevail 
amongst transactions using buyers’ agents. Furthermore, 
the time on the market is subject to selling prices with 
different agency arrangements. Transactions conducted 
by agents with a higher (lower) selling price is shown to 
be attributable to a shorter (longer) time-on-the market 
(TOM). In our empirical test, a transaction conducted by 
a seller’s agents (with a selling price premium) is shown to 
have a shorter TOM as compared to a transaction involv-
ing a buyer’s agent (with a selling price discount).
The contribution of this study is fourfold. First, this 
study provides the first empirical evidence to distinguish the 
distinct effects of sellers’ agents and buyers’ agents on the 
two primary transaction outcomes, namely sale price and 
time on the market. The findings of this study confirm Bag-
noli and Khanna’s (1987, 1991) theoretical explanation of the 
existence of sellers’ agents on the property market, i.e., that 
sellers’ agent benefit sellers by significantly reducing home-
buyers’ search costs, which is captured by the selling price 
premium. Second, this case study in a Chinese city challeng-
es the (oversimplified) assumption of previous studies that 
sellers’ agents and buyers’ agents are two identical agency ar-
rangements. Indeed, our results are not intended to jeopard-
ise the past research on agency; instead, we would like future 
research on property agency to be aware of the differences 
between sellers’ and buyers’ agents and to develop further 
material studies in this sphere. Third, this study also sug-
gests that experienced sellers’ agents, especially those with 
three to four years of work experience are more successful 
in negotiating a higher selling price, while work experience 
does not help them shorten the marketing time of the prop-
erties. Last, this study introduces online listing information 
from online to offline (O2O) platform as an innovative data 
source for analysing the agent’s effect on property price and 
time on the market. This novel data source can greatly ben-
efit future studies in China real estate market.
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